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1. INTRODUCTION 
Government and government agencies are the sole repository of much valuable 
information. The methods used by government to disseminate information to the 
public have changed significantly in the last five to 10 years.  Advances in technology 
have changed the accessibility of information and governments have been more 
willing to use the internet as a means of dissemination.  While some information is 
still specifically requested in exchange for payment of a fee, other information is 
freely available in publications or on the internet.  Not only has accessibility of the 
information changed but also the complexity of the information.  Freely available 
information is commonly available from government web sites and some of that 
information is aggregated data, compiled from a federation of sites operated by 
different government agencies.  Government agencies also sell information to 
commercial providers who may or may not enhance the information or collate it to 
provide to paying customers.  Thus, information recipients may be given the 
information free of charge or may be taking it upon the payment of a fee.   
 
It is because of the diversity of access, purposes for which the information is utilised 
and the complex variety of forms in which the same information appears, that it is 
necessary to review the liability for the provision of all information from a number of 
viewpoints.  The other aspect of the giving of information freely to the public is that 
such information must be accessible to any seeker and that a recipient can use the 
information for any purpose over which the government cannot really have any 
control, except in the case of resale. 
 
In most fields of human endeavour, it is necessary to seek information which the 
recipient regards as ‘official’ and the only source of much of this information is usually 
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 the government in its varied guises, Commonwealth, State, local or in the guise of a 
government agency.  Nearly all of these sources, loosely termed ‘public authorities’, 
are information monopolists.  They are bodies constituted by statute and ‘entrusted 
by (that) statute with functions to be performed in the public interest or for public 
purposes’.4 Whatever these types of bodies may be called, it is clear that they are 
invested by statute with certain powers and exercise those powers in the discharge 
of their duties5 in the course of carrying out their functions. 
 
This article principally concerns itself with the liability of those bodies for the 
dissemination of information to the public in circumstances where the recipients are 
reliant upon the information for serious commercial purposes such as the 
acquisition or disposition of property or businesses. The effect of disclaimers 
commonly found in information received from government sources which seek to 
absolve the information giver from the consequences of any inaccuracy, are also 
examined. 
 
 Subject to this, Ggenerally, where an information recipient has relied upon the 
information supplied and has suffered loss, specifically economic loss as a 
consequence, the information provider may be liable to pay compensation for that 
loss.  Whilst the cause of action is normally for damages for negligence, the sale of 
information to commercial on-sellers makes it necessary to consider the risks of 
liability for misleading or deceptive conduct.6 Several examples are used to 
examine the different situations in which government agencies provide information 
to consumers.  The article then considers whether a change in the methods of 
providing this information alters government liability.  The first change is the 
increasingly common provision of free information via the internet and secondly, the 
sale of government information to a commercial provider for a fee, who then passes 
it on to the public for a higher fee.  
  
                                                
4  Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424 at 456 per Mason J (as he then 
was). 
5  Ibid at 442 per Gibbs CJ. 
6  This liability will be under the relevant State Fair Trading Act in respect of information 
given by a State government or instrumentality.  In the case of a local government the 
liability may fall under either the Trade Practices Act or the relevant State Fair Trading 
Act.  However, it is unlikely that the public body supplying this type of information would 
be acting in trade and commerce at the time.  This issue is considered in more detail in 
Part 4 of the article. 
 It is first proposed to consider the liability of public authorities for negligence and 
secondly, in the much narrower class of case of liability for misleading or deceptive 
conduct.   
 
 
 
2.  CLAIMS IN NEGLIGENCE FOR PURE ECONOMIC LOSS 
 
The common law imposes a duty of care upon a public authority similar to that it 
imposes upon a member of the public, a business or a corporation, if the activities 
being carried out by the public authority are similar to the activities of the member of 
the public, business or corporation.7  However, a claim for pure economic loss arising 
from negligence is classified as a novel situation, that is, there is no precedent for the 
duty of care and whether a duty is owed is decided upon its own facts with reference 
to decided cases by analogy. In the context of pure economic loss arising from the 
provision of information, the obvious cause of action would be negligent 
misstatement and there are cases in which a public authority has been held to be 
liable for negligent misstatement.8  However, more recent cases demonstrate that if 
the information provided by the public authority is incorrect due to a failure to properly 
search records, a claim in negligence may be made without focussing on the 
misstatement.9   
 
2.1 Formulation of the Duty of Care 
The current approach of the High Court of Australia to novel duties of care requires a 
consideration of many factors, including the harm suffered, the relationship between 
                                                
7  D Villa, Annotated Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), (Thomson, LawBook Co, Sydney, 
2004), [5.42.020].   For example, in Nagle v Rottnest Island Authority (1993) 177 CLR 
423; 112 ALR 393 the authority was liable as occupier for personal injury to a visitor to the 
Reserve which the authority managed and controlled.  However, although a duty of care 
is often conceded by the defendant public authority, the nature and scope of the duty and 
the issue of breach is contested.  See also Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) 
(1998) 192 CLR 431; Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 442; 221 ALR 711; 
Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) v Royal (2007) 238 ALR 761.. 
8  See San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering the Environmental and Planning Act 
1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 68 ALR 161; Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 
CLR 424; L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (1981) 150 CLR 
225; 36 ALR 385. 
9  For example, in South Australia v Vehicle Auctions Pty Ltd [2003] SASC 146 the 
respondent took consignment of a car upon evidence of registration.  The care had been 
registered in New South Wales when stolen and later was registered in South Australia.  
The paperwork for registration in South Australia mistakenly indicated that a stolen 
vehicle search had been carried out.  The case was argued on negligence without 
reference to misstatement and it was held that no duty was owed.  
 the plaintiff and defendant, the defendant’s control and the plaintiff’s vulnerability, 
whether there would be any conflict with another existing duty and relevant policy.10  
However, many decades before this approach to novel duties, the High Court in 
Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt,11 held that a claim for pure 
economic loss arising from a negligent misstatement required a ‘special relationship’ 
between the provider of the information and the recipient for a duty of care to exist.  
In that case Barwick CJ explained the ‘special relationship’ as: 
… the circumstances must be such as to have caused the speaker or be calculated to 
cause a reasonable person in the position of the speaker to realize that he is being 
trusted by the recipient of the information or advice to give information which the 
recipient believes the speaker to possess or to which the recipient believes the 
speaker to have access or to give advice, about a matter upon or in respect of which 
the recipient believes the speaker to possess a capacity or opportunity for judgment, 
in either case the subject matter of the information or advice being of a serious or 
business nature… 
 
Then the speaker must realize or the circumstances be such that he ought to have 
realized that the recipient intends to act upon the information or advice in respect of 
his property or of himself in connexion with some matter of business or serious 
consequence…  
 
Further, it seems to me that the circumstances must be such that it is reasonable in 
all the circumstances for the recipient to seek, or to accept, and to rely upon the 
utterance of the speaker.12  
 
For a duty of care to be owed for negligent misstatement, it must be proven: 
(i) that there is an actionable misrepresentation; 
(ii) the pure economic loss is the reasonably foreseeable consequence of 
providing the negligent advice or information; 
(iii) the recipient relied upon the advice or information and it was reasonable to do 
so in the circumstances; and 
(iv) there was an assumption of responsibility on the part of the provider of the 
advice or information. 
 
2.1.1 Misrepresentation 
There is a great degree of diversity in the nature of information supplied by public 
bodies or individuals whose source of information is a public body or comes from a 
source as a result of the information provider being a public official.  A government 
may float many proposals, some simply to gauge public reaction before the 
proposal is taken further or dropped if the reception is poor.  Information in the form 
                                                
10  See Perre v Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180; Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 183 ALR 
404; Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515.. 
11  (1968) 122 CLR 556; [1969] ALR 3. 
12  (1968) 122 CLR 556 at 571; [1969] ALR 3 at 12.  
 of a proposal or a political promise is not to be treated as a statement of fact by its 
audience.  Some proposals which are the product of research and a discussion 
paper are better formulated than others but should still not enjoy the status of fact.  
Until it is resolved to adopt a proposal, it does not even become policy, and even 
then there may be insuperable obstacles to implementation.13  
 
Public bodies should therefore be extremely cautious how information is labeled 
and presented and properly qualify any statement made where that is appropriate, 
particularly if the information conveyed might be capable of being utilised for a 
serious purpose and be influential in an important  decision making process.14 For 
example, in San Sebastian v Minister Administering the Environment and 
Assessment Act 1979,15 a developer purchased land for redevelopment purposes 
relying upon alleged representations in a proposed development plan which at the 
time, although supported publicly by the relevant local authority, had no statutory 
force as a planning instrument.  After a while, the proposal was abandoned.  The 
developer brought an action for damages for negligent misstatement against the 
Minister upon the basis that the publication of that type of information was bound to 
influence persons such as developers in their choice of acquisition of property.  The 
claim failed as it could not be shown that the public authority concerned had made 
any representations that the plan would be adopted in its published form or at all.  
As the development plan, so the court said was never given any ‘entrenched or 
statutory status by relevant town planning legislation’, it could not fetter the 
discretion of the authority that released it and thus could not be reasonably relied 
upon to support the purchase of property in anticipation of its promulgation.16 
 
Thus, ministerial statements in parliament,17 public statements made by a politician 
pre-election18 and statements of government policy, true at the time, but later 
abandoned have been held not to be actionable negligent misstatements.19  
                                                
13  For a meaning of the expression ‘proposal’ in relation to prospective government action, 
see Gagliardi v Lamont [1976] Qd R 53 at 54; Alusta Pty Ltd v Duncan [1973] 2 NSWLR 
467 at 477. 
14  Sved v Woollahra Municipal Council (1995) 86 LGERA 222 at 233. 
15  (1986) 162 CLR 340. 
16   Ibid at 359. 
17   Hamsher v Swift (1992) 33 FCR 545 at 562.  Note also that s 16(3)(c) of the In the 
Federal Parliament,the conduct of members is governed by the Parliamentary Privilges 
Act 1987 (Cth) prevents and by Guidelines for the Presentation of Government 
Documents, Government Responses Ministerial Statements and Other Instruments to the 
Parliament, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet ,April 2004 (as amended 3 
February 2005) paras 69-82.any statement in Parliamentary proceedings to be accepted 
as evidence by a court or tribunal for the purpose of ’drawing, or inviting the drawing of, 
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An action for negligent misstatement against a government decision maker, like a 
Minister of the Crown, may be misconceived where the proper remedy might be a 
judicial review of the decision upon which the statement was based.20 One of the 
only successful claims made against a Crown Minister for negligent misstatement 
occurred in Meates v Attorney General,21 where a Crown Minister directed 
statements to a certain identified group of the public urging them to invest in a 
corporation upon the basis that it was going to receive government financial 
support.  After the shareholders   invested in the corporation, the government 
withdrew its support and they suffered significant financial losses.  The New 
Zealand Court of Appeal found that the shareholders were owed a duty of care by 
the Minister and the statement, although made in the heat of an election campaign, 
was found to have the same weight as an actionable representation as if it had 
been made by the promoter of a commercial enterprise.22 This was an unusual 
case given the context of the negligent misstatement.  However, not only were the 
statements directed explicitly at attracting the investment in the failed corporation, 
but also reliance upon them, even in those circumstances, was found to be 
reasonable.  Similarly, in Meadow Gem Pty Ltd v ANZ Executors and Trustee Co 
Ltd23 two Crown Ministers who failed to break silence to correct an obvious public 
misapprehension of the creditworthiness of certain building societies of which they 
were well aware were held to have a case to answer for damages for negligence 
failing to have the claim against them struck out. 
 
It is clear that, save for a few exceptional cases, an action will rarely lie against a 
public official or a public body for negligent misstatement where a claimant has 
suffered loss after taking action in reliance upon ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ statements 
emanating from those sources. 
 
2.1.2 Reasonable Foreseeability of Loss 
                                                                                                                                         
inferences or conclusions wholly or partly from anything forming part of those proceedings 
in Parliament’. 
18   Durant v Greiner (1991) 21 NSWLR 119 at 129. 
19   Unilan Holdings Pty Ltd v Kerin (1992) 107 ALR 709 at 714 (affirmed on appeal (1993) 44 
FCR 481). 
20   Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd [1988] AC 473 at 501 (PC). 
21   [1983] NZLR 308. 
22   Ibid at 335. 
23    (1994) ATPR (Digest) 46-130. 
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 The requirement that the loss be the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the 
alleged negligent act or omission is the threshold requirement for all novel duty 
situations.24  If the loss is not reasonably foreseeable, there can be no duty of care.  
However, if the loss is reasonably foreseeable in an action for negligent 
misstatement, for a duty to exist the circumstances must be give rise to the required 
‘special relationship’.25  The test of reasonable foreseeability has been long 
established, it must be considered whether the defendant, either individually or as a 
member of a class, could suffer harm classified as pure economic loss as a result of 
the negligence.26 
 
2.1.3 Reasonable Reliance 
It must be reasonable for the recipient to rely upon the advice or information.27   It 
has long been settled that a duty of care will arise where a public authority directs a 
misstatement to a class of persons with the intention of inducing members of that 
class to act, or to refrain from acting, in reliance upon the misstatement in 
circumstances where the maker of the statement ought to realise that the recipients 
may suffer economic loss should the statement be untrue.28  There is no 
requirement for special skill, however in L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v 
Parramatta City Council, Gibbs CJ stated: 
 
 From the standpoint of principle there is no difference between a person who 
carries on the business of supplying information and a public body which in the 
exercise of its public functions follows the practice of supplying information which is 
available to it more readily than to other persons, whether or not it has a statutory 
duty to do so.  In either case, the person giving the information to another whom he 
knows will rely upon it in circumstances in which it is reasonable for him to do so, is 
under a duty to exercise reasonable care that the information given is correct.  A 
public body, by following the practice of supplying information upon which the 
recipients are likely to rely for serious purposes, lets it be known that it is willing to 
                                                
24  Reasonable foreseeability is the a  major element in deciding touchstone as to whether a 
duty of care will be imposed in a novel situation: sSee Tame v New South Wales; Annetts 
v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 211 CLR 317; 191 ALR 449. 
25  Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556 at 571; [1969] ALR 
3 at 12. 
26  See Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 198 ALR 100 at [10].  This 
requires more than reasonable foreseeability of harm in a general sense. 
27  Reliance upon the advice or information is said to be the ‘cornerstone of liability for 
negligent misstatement’: San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering the 
Environmental and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340 at 357; 68 ALR 161 at 
170. 
28   San Sebastian Pty Ltd v The Minister Administering the Environmental and Planning Act 
1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340 at 355;  68 ALR 161 at 169 per Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and 
Dawson JJ; Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159 at 170-171 per Brennan CJ.  An intention 
to induce reliance is evidence that the reliance upon the advice or information was 
reasonable: Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Peak Marwick Hungerfords (Reg) (1997) 
188 CLR 24; 142 ALR 750. 
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 exercise reasonable skill and diligence in ensuring that the information supplied is 
accurate.  In the circumstances, diligence might be more important than skill, 
although competence in searching for and transmitting the information must play a 
part.  However, even if diligence only and not skill were required, a public body 
might be specially competent to supply material which it had in its possession for 
the purposes of its public functions.29   
 
As government entities are often the sole repositories of information for certain 
transactions, it can be expected that any information requested is provided in 
compliance with the procedures set by the entity and that it is competent to 
provide the information or advice.30  This monopoly or control of the information 
would arguably make reliance reasonable.  However, if the government entity is 
not in the practice of providing information it may not be considered to be 
reasonable reliance.31 
 
2.1.4 Assumption of Responsibility 
The concepts of reasonable reliance and assumption of responsibility are closely 
linked.  For an assumption of responsibility on the part of the government entity it 
must be established that it knew or ought to have realised that it was being trusted to 
provide the information or advice and that the recipient intended to rely upon it. 32  It 
is not essential that the maker of the statement know the precise use to which the 
information will be put, so long as he or she knows, or ought to know, that it will be 
used for a serious purpose.33  In Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board34 the government 
entity provided the appellants with an estimate upon request for the cost of 
connecting water to land being developed.  The high estimate meant that the 
development was not viable and the land had to be sold to repay the loan but a lower 
price was obtained so the developers suffered a loss.  It was later discovered that the 
estimate was approximately three times excessive.  A majority of the High Court (4:3) 
held that there was no assumption of responsibility for the provision of the estimate 
by the Water Board.  The Water Board was not in the practice of providing such 
                                                
29  (1981) 150 CLR 225 at 235; 36 ALR 385 at 392 (emphasis added). 
30  Mid Density Developments Pty Ltd v Rockdale Municipal Council (1993) 44 FCR 290. 
31  In Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 178 ALR 634 the respondent was not 
obliged to provide an estimate for the cost of water supply to a property development but 
had done so reluctantly when pressured by the appellant.  The appellant also had its own 
experts available for advice.  A majority of the High Court held that therefore the reliance 
was not reasonable in the circumstances:  at [49]. 
32  Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968)122 CLR 556 at 571; [1969] ALR 
3 at 12.   
33    L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (1981) 150 CLR 225 at 248-
249 per Mason J (as he then was); Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 178 
ALR 634 at [74] per Gaudron J. 
34  (2001) 206 CLR 1; 178 ALR 634. 
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 estimates and had no appreciation, nor could it be expected to appreciate, the 
consequences should the estimate be incorrect.35 
 
The requirement for the establishment of a ‘special relationship’ has not been 
overruled.36  However, comparing the characteristics of the ‘special relationship’ with 
the factors a court must consider when faced with a novel duty scenario, it is possible 
to see the similarities, especially as both approaches examine the relationship 
between the parties involved.  The assumption of responsibility in the ‘special 
relationship’ (where the speaker must realise or ought to realise that they are being 
trusted to provide the information and the recipient intends to rely upon it) may be 
equated with the notion of the defendant’s control of the situation in the multi-factorial 
approach.37  The vulnerability of the plaintiff,38 their inability to protect their interests, 
has similarities with the plaintiff trusting the defendant and it being reasonable for 
them to rely upon the information in light of all of the circumstances.  A party seeking 
information concerning a serious transaction from a government entity that is the sole 
repository of the information would be vulnerable – they would have to rely upon the 
entity to provide the information with all due diligence. 
 
2.1.5 Civil Liability Legislation 
Unlike professional providers of advice or information, public authorities are not in a 
contractual relationship with the recipient of the advice or information and nor is there 
any expected benefit or gain on their part.39  Public authorities also differ from the 
usual defendant as traditionally they were immune from suit in tort.  Such blanket 
immunity no longer exists, but added to the complication of establishing the novel 
duty of care is the civil liability legislation.  The Ipp Report included in its reference 
the principles applied in negligence to limit the liability of public authorities, focusing 
on the allocation of resources and the making of social policy.40  As a result of the Ipp 
Report, the civil liability legislation of all jurisdictions, except for South Australia and 
                                                
35  Ibid at [47] and [82]-[86]. 
36  See for example, Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board (2001) 206 CLR 1; 178 ALR 634 at [47] 
[75], [76], [90] and [139].  All members of the court accepted the principle stated by 
Barwick CJ in Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968)122 CLR 556; 
[1969] ALR 3. 
37  Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; 164 ALR 606 at [33]. 
38  Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; 183 ALR 404 at [37]. 
39  See Council of the City of Lismore v Stewart (1990) 18 NSWLR 718. 
40  D Ipp (Chair), Review of the Law of Negligence – Final Report, October 2002 (Ipp 
Report), Ch 10. 
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 the Northern Territory, contain similar provisions in relation to the liability of public 
authorities.41  For example, s 35 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) provides: 
 
Principles concerning resources, responsibilities etc. of public or other 
authorities 
The following principles apply to a proceeding in deciding whether a public or other 
authority has a duty or has breached a duty —  
(a)  the functions required to be exercised by the authority are limited by the 
financial and other resources that are reasonably available to the authority for 
the purpose of exercising the functions; 
(b)  the general allocation of financial or other resources by the authority is not 
open to challenge; 
(c)  the functions required to be exercised by the authority are to be decided by 
reference to the broad range of its activities (and not merely by reference to the 
matter to which the proceeding relates); 
(d)  the authority may rely on evidence of its compliance with its general 
procedures and any applicable standards for the exercise of its functions as 
evidence of the proper exercise of its functions in the matter to which the 
proceeding relates. 
 
As of yet there have been no negligent misstatement cases decided upon the 
application of the civil liability legislation in respect of public authorities.  A reading of 
the Ipp Report and the relevant provisions indicates that an action against a public 
authority for misstatement will still be approached from the perspective of the need 
for a ‘special relationship’ for a duty to be owed.  The rationale is that the provisions 
of the civil liability legislation relate to the principles concerning resources and 
responsibilities of public authorities, that is, they are concerned with protecting the 
right to make policy decisions about the allocation of resources and allowing 
evidence of compliance with general procedures and standards as evidence of 
proper exercise of the functions of the public authorities.  In a number of instances 
considered in this paper, putting aside the effect of any disclaimers to be examined 
later, the implementation of these principles would not alter the ultimate result where 
the public body had acted negligently in the supply of information, particularly where 
it had not adhered to its general procedures in doing so.  Dealing with requests for 
information, collating that information and supplying it in an approved form are well 
within the functions of a public body, and particularly where there is statutory 
sanction for this process, no issue of resources should arise.  The matter relating to 
compliance with general procedures is of greater relevance in this connection.  
Claims based upon a failure to follow processes in mining information to be 
disseminated to the public have already been tested against the accepted 
procedures to determine whether they were followed and whether a failure to do so 
                                                
41  See Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 42; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 35; Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (Tas) s 38; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 83; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5W; Civil 
Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 110. 
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 might exhibit elements of actionable negligence or negate the effect of a general 
disclaimer.42 
 
Whether the law of misstatement is relied upon or not, an action against a public 
authority for the negligent provision of information is a claim for compensation for 
pure economic loss and therefore the duty of care owed by the public authority must 
be determined on its own facts.  If a duty of care is owed, there must be a breach of 
that duty for liability to be imposed upon the public authority.  The standard of care 
imposed is that reasonable care is taken in providing the advice or information, that 
is, the speaker must not mislead the recipient.43   
 
 
3. NEGLIGENT MISSTATEMENT BY GOVERNMENT AND COMMON 
SITUATIONS 
 
With these general principles in mind, it is appropriate to consider what the courts 
take into account and consider relevant in situations in which a public authority may 
be held liable for negligence.  These circumstances may include: 
(i) Where the public authority has a statutory duty to provide the information 
sought for a fee or without a fee upon a formal request; 
(ii) Where the public authority provides the information formally without such 
duty to do so but upon request; 
(iii) Where official factual information is provided informally upon request; 
(iv) Where predictive information is provided after formal request. 
 
3.1 Statutory Duty to Provide Information 
The failure to discharge a statutory obligation to provide information is the most 
overt instance in which a public authority may be liable for loss or damage suffered 
by an information recipient.  This is the occasion from which much of the case law 
has arisen.  This circumstance comprehends the situation where normally a statute 
will give the right to a member of the public to search a public register by the 
                                                
42  For example, Mid Density Developments Pty Ltd v Rockdale Municipal Council (1993) 44 
FCR 290 at 299-300 (no consultation of records to compose response); Dancorp 
Developers v Auckland City Council [1991] 3 NZLR 337 (important contamination report 
missing from file in Council records of property). 
43  Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 654; Mutual Life & Citizens’ 
Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968)122 CLR 556; [1969] ALR 3; San Sebastian Pty Ltd v 
Minister Administering the Environmental and Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340; 
68 ALR 161.   
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 submission of a government approved form and the payment of a prescribed fee.  
The approved form will invariably set out clearly what information will be provided 
and thus restricts the extent of the information. 
 
The fact of the payment of a fee has been held not to give rise to a contractual 
relationship between the public body and the information seeker but merely be a 
charge to defray some of the costs incurred in meeting the request.44 The recipient 
cannot negotiate concerning what information they need, all enquirers are given the 
same information for the same fee.45 The common law liability for the provision of a 
‘statutory certificate’ for a set fee rests entirely in tort, as opposed to contract, 
notwithstanding the amount of the fee or the extent of the information provided.46 
 
In providing that ‘certified’ information the public body will be aware of the reason 
for the request as it is often to be included in the form of request.  The acquisition 
or charging of property, for example, will be understood by the authority to occasion 
a request for a serious purpose where the recipient will be relying upon the 
information to make a decision whether to proceed to complete a purchase or to 
lend money to the owner of the property by way of charge. 
 
There is, therefore, an expectation that the records of the authority from which the 
particular information is sought, will not only be accurate but also that they will be 
accessed with care and, perhaps, even checked for accuracy before being 
released.  In Mid Density Developments Pty Ltd v Rockdale Municipal Council,47 
information relating to flooding upon property being purchased was provided by a 
local authority to a purchaser in a statutory certificate.  The responsible officer 
whose task it was to check official records, retrieve the information and prepare the 
certificate failed to do so, content instead to rely upon his memory to perform the 
task.  When the purchasers applied to subdivide the land, an approval was given 
subject to flood conditions which would have made the development unprofitable.  
In holding the local authority liable in negligence, the court observed that the 
                                                
44    Coshott v Woollahra Municipal Council (1988) 14 NSWLR 675 at 684 per Wood J. 
45    Lismore City Council v Stewart (1989) 18 NSWLR 718 at 726 per Hope AJA. 
46    Burke v Forbes Shire Council (1987) 63 LGRA 1 at 11 per Allen J. 
47    (1993) 44 FCR 290. See also Rockdale City Council v Micro Developments Pty Ltd [2008] 
NSWCA 128 where the council provided a s 149 certificate under the Environmental 
Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) that stated the incorrect zoning for the land 
the respondents planned to develop.  The council admitted negligence in representing 
that the land was zoned to allow residential units.  The case raised the issue of 
assessment of damages 
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 essence of the purchaser’s case was that the officer failed to follow the standard 
procedure laid down for the retrieval of the information which was actually stated 
upon the certificate itself48 and, as such, the disclaimer had no operation.  There is 
an expectation in information seekers that there would be a systematic procedure 
adopted by public authorities where there are multiple requests for the same 
information and that the information would be garnered from existing records which 
should have been properly prepared and maintained.  These cases are not 
controversial and illustrate circumstances creating the highest duty of care. 
 
3.2 No Statutory Duty to Provide Information 
There are other circumstances where, in the undertaking of another task, a public 
body becomes bound to disclose information of obvious importance to the person 
for whom the task is being performed.  This is a case where there is no statutory 
duty to provide the information as such, but a duty of care to advise a person, with 
an obvious interest in a matter, of  the existence of a certain state of affairs.  
Usually, the information is of a kind which would be of critical importance to the 
decision making processes of the recipient of the information and the public body.  
The cases have arisen largely in the course of members of the public enquiring 
about land use suitability either prior to purchase or development of the land.  For 
instance, in Dancorp Developers v Auckland City Council,49 a prospective 
purchaser for development purposes inquired of a local authority and water board 
as to the suitability of five acres of land for subdivision, and upon being told that 
there were no barriers to subdivision, purchased the site in reliance upon that 
information.  When the subdivisional approval was later withdrawn by the local 
authority, because of soil contamination, the purchaser claimed damages for the 
losses it had suffered as a result of the purchase.  The purchaser alleged that the 
local authority knew or ought to have known that the site, previously used by a 
timber treatment plant, was grossly contaminated by toxic chemicals and required 
very costly remediation before it could have been used for another purpose.  
Evidence adduced at the trial indicated that the authority’s engineer was not aware 
that the land was contaminated as a perusal of the relevant files in the authority 
would not have led to this conclusion as a vital report was missing from the files.  
However, Smellie J held that that the local authority could not be found negligent 
for not having a more sophisticated filing system which would have revealed that 
the site might be contaminated as suggested by the purchaser.  His Honour said 
                                                
48  Ibid at 302.  Contrast City of Botany Bay Council v Jazabas Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 94. 
49   [1991] 3 NZLR 337. 
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 that ‘it was an unknown contingency and the borough could not have reasonably 
expected to either engage additional skilled staff or divert its senior officers into 
such a peripheral and potentially fruitless exercise.  Evidence suggested that the 
filing system in place was above average’.50 This is an instance where the records 
of the public body were not complete but no liability ensued because of the 
absence of relevant material from the file under consideration was   not held to 
evidence negligence. 
 
The situation was factually different in Alec Finlayson Pty Ltd v Armidale City 
Council51 where Burchett J found that a local authority ought to have known about 
the contamination of prospective land it had approved for residential development.  
With that knowledge, the authority should have either refused the application or 
granted it only subject to remediation conditions.52 In failing to disclose this 
information (and take it into account when assessing the subdivisional application), 
the authority breached its duty of care to the applicant. 
 
This principle squares with other similar decisions elsewhere.  For example, in 
Brown v Heathcote County Council, 53 a council engineer was in the habit of giving 
applicants for building permits information about the flood levels of local rivers and 
creeks when approving drainage proposals when there was no obligation to do so 
and not in response to a formal request.  Even given the fact that there was no 
statutory obligation to do so, it was held that the local authority owed a duty to 
applicants to consider the issue of flood levels when issuing building permits and a 
failure to do so would generate liability at the suit of those aggrieved applicants who 
later discovered that their land was flood prone.  Whilst these cases present the 
application of a different principle going beyond the maintenance of records and 
their proper consultation to advise the public of information of which they should be 
aware before engaging in construction activity, it also reveals a dysfunctional 
approach to record keeping and decision making  in the circumstances.  In 
essence, these cases reveal the consequences of supplying only part of the 
information necessary for the recipient to make an informed decision upon a 
serious issue of which the authority was fully aware. 
 
                                                
50    Ibid at 353, 354. 
51    (1994) 51 FCR 378. 
52    Ibid at 412. 
53    [1986] 1 NZLR 76 (affirmed [1987] 1 NZLR 720 (PC)). 
Formatted: Font: (Default) Arial
Formatted: Font: (Default) Arial
Formatted: Font: (Default) Arial
Formatted: Font: (Default) Arial
Formatted: Font: (Default) Arial
Formatted: Font: (Default) Arial
Formatted: Font: (Default) Arial
Formatted: Font: (Default) Arial
 The maintenance of public records and the procedures undertaken to access them 
and take information from them to give to members of the public who enquire have 
come under the scrutiny of the courts.  Where the request for a certain type of 
information is recurrent, proper procedures, including checks of information drawn 
from the records should be in place.  Where the information sought is of a non 
recurrent or one-off basis, although there would not be any protocols in place 
regarding the procedure for capture and dissemination of the information, there 
would be a standard of care expected by the intended recipient based upon an 
appreciation by the information giver of the reason for the request and the fact that 
there was going to be reliance placed upon the accuracy of the information for a 
serious purpose such as acquisition of property.  This would be so particularly 
where the enquirer makes known that purpose or it can be inferred from the context 
of the inquiry.  The one off information provision outside these ‘official’ records 
gives rise to difficulties of its own. 
 
3.3 Information Formally Requested Outside Existing Official Process 
There are mixed judicial views as to the extent a public body should go outside its 
official records to respond to a request for information.  Generally, a public body will 
not have to go beyond the records kept, assuming that they are properly 
maintained, in order to respond to a formal query.  For example, a local authority 
giving advice concerning the suitability of land for subdivision would not have to 
undertake contaminated land testing upon the land to ascertain whether 
decontamination were required, but if it was aware of the fact of contamination, it 
would have to disclose it as part of its process to determine the suitability of the 
land for that purpose.  Even constructive knowledge of such a defect may be 
sufficient to bring a local authority to account in these circumstances but no breach 
of a duty of care exists if there are no circumstances to raise any question, for 
example, of contamination.54 Problems arise where the information is sought and 
given informally outside the defined processes for disseminating that type of 
information. 
 
However, a local authority must use reasonable judgment before it certifies any 
particular state of affairs.  For example, in Pisano v Fairfield City Council, 55 a local 
authority was aware that a dwelling was being constructed on filled land and that its 
                                                
54   Dancorp v Auckland City Council [1991] 3 NZLR 337 at 352 per Smellie J; Alec Finlayson 
Pty Ltd v Armidale City Council (1994) 51 FCR 378 at 401-402 per Burchett J. 
55   (1991) 73 LGERA 184. 
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 construction had only been approved upon the condition that special foundations 
were laid.  Upon the completion of the dwelling, the authority issued a certificate to 
the effect that the dwelling had been built in accordance with those original 
specifications when a cursory inspection would have revealed otherwise.  The 
issue of the certificate of compliance without an inspection was held to be negligent 
in the circumstances of the special case where it would have been obvious to the 
information supplier that a higher standard of care should have been exercised.56 
The liability of the council was exacerbated as they issued a certificate to that 
effect. 
 
However, where there is nothing untoward upon the records so as to raise a 
suspicion of something out of the ordinary, for example, in the case of possible non 
compliance with approved building plans, a physical inspection to confirm 
information beyond the records kept will not be required to discharge the duty of 
care in the provision of the information even though there may be some defect in 
the subject being certified as correctly constructed.57 The omission in this instance 
was in the record keeping not in the manner in which the records were accessed. 
 
3.4 Informal Requests for Official Factual Information 
These instances have posed great difficulties for the courts and reveal a general 
principle that the manner of inquiry will not necessarily lower the duty of care owed 
to the recipient of advice.  However, the formulation of a general principle is not 
easy.  The starting point for these cases is normally L Shaddock & Associates v 
Parramatta City Council58 where a potential purchaser of land made two inquiries of 
a local authority, the first by telephone and the second by formal submission of an 
approved search form accompanied by a fee, regarding road widening proposals 
which might affect the relevant land.  In the first instance, an unidentified officer 
advised that the land was not so affected and this was later confirmed by the 
written response to the second enquiry.  Although the authority was held liable, it 
was principally on the written, more formal response which was also wrong.  Both 
Gibbs CJ59 and Stephen J,60 in dictum, stated that it would not have been 
reasonable for the purchaser to rely upon the telephone response from an 
unidentified officer of the council.  This was because the purchaser was aware of a 
                                                
56   Ibid., at 191, 194 per Kirby P. 
57   King v Stewart (1994) 85  LGERA 384 at 394. 
58   (1981) 150 CLR 225. 
59   Ibid at 236. 
60   Ibid at 238. 
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 more formal method of accessing the same information for which an approved form 
of enquiry was available.  L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City 
Council 61 was distinguished in Bivone v City of Salisbury62 where a similar enquiry 
was made of a building inspector in the offices of the local authority.  This enquiry 
was treated by Matheson J as a ‘serious and highly relevant enquiry’ which the 
building inspector should have realised was being relied upon by the owner to give 
the permission to the builder to proceed.63 It is difficult to see the difference 
between the two cases except that in the former case, the telephone call was to be 
followed up by a formal enquiry in writing.  Although both verbal and subsequent 
formal written advice concerning appropriate zoning for subdivision was incorrectly 
given by a town planner employed by the local authority in Kyogle Shire Council v 
Francis64, Mahoney JA intimated, in dictum, that the council would have been liable 
even if the formal written advice had not been sought.65 A similar result followed in 
Kyriacou  & Bonhomie Pty Ltd v Kogarah Municipal Council 66 where Durnford J 
held that an inaccurate verbal response to a telephone inquiry about suitability of 
zoning was a breach of the council’s duty of care in the circumstances and found 
the council liable for negligent misstatement.  Here, the relevant, identified officer 
indicated that he knew the property in question thus giving the information recipient 
greater comfort that the advice was true.67 
 
Clearly, the majority of cases arise from inaccurate responses to informal (usually 
telephone) enquiries.  The trend of authority suggests that the adoption of such a 
means of enquiry does not necessarily suggest that the enquirer is not set upon a 
serious purpose even when more formal means of enquiry are available, and in 
some cases, actually subsequently utilised.  The suggestion is that the more 
specific the requested information, the higher the duty of care to be accurate.  In 
each case, the provider was made aware of the purpose of the enquiry and could 
glean from that enquiry and the context explained that reliance was being placed 
upon it to enter into legal relations with a third party.  In Woollahra Municipal 
Council v Sved 68 it was held that a duty of care arose from an unconfirmed 
statement in a telephone conversation that a certificate would be issued.  The 
                                                
61   (1981) 150 CLR 225. 
62   (1981) 50 LGRA 94. 
63    Ibid at 110-111. 
64    (1988) 13 NSWLR 396. 
65  Ibid at 408. 
66   (1995) 88 LGERA 110. 
67    Ibid at 121. 
68  (1996) 40 NSWLR 101. 
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 respondent and the officer of the council had been identified to each other and the 
officer was aware that the settlement of the property was conditional upon the 
issuing of the certificate.69 
 
3.5 Predictive Information Supplied after Informal Request 
The circumstances in which this might occur could be various.  The supply of 
information (or non-supply) could occur during the course of some other action 
being requested or as a result of a direct enquiry to the public authority to which it 
may have no legal obligation to respond.   
 
The latter situation arose in Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board,70 discussed above, 
where a Water Board constituted by statutory authority provided an estimate of the 
cost to have a proposed subdivision connected to the water supply system when 
asked by a member of parliament on behalf of a developer constituent.  In finding 
that the Board, in giving the estimate at that time, owed no duty of care to the 
developer, several crucial points emerged.  First, there was no statutory obligation 
upon the Board to give estimates of this nature to developers.71 Secondly, in 
contrast to the position exemplified by L Shaddock and Associates Pty Ltd v 
Parramatta City Council,72  it was not the practice of the Board to answer inquiries 
to which it was not obliged to respond.73 Thirdly, the Board had not been made 
aware of the circumstances of the enquiry, particularly of the reason for the request 
which had been initiated by the developer’s bankers who were seeking information 
from which they would make the critical decision to appoint a receiver to the 
developer company.  The developer, whom the Board might have doubtless 
assumed was receiving expert advice upon the cost of subdivision, was not seen 
by the Board74 to be within the class of ‘vulnerable persons’ incapable of self 
protection to whom a duty might be owed.75 It is appropriate to note that three of 
the seven judges dissented holding that a duty of care was owed to the developer 
and that there was sufficient evidence to suggest that the purpose of the enquiry 
                                                
69  Ibid at 111, 126, 145. 
70   (2001) 206 CLR 1; 178 ALR 634. 
71    Ibid at [14]. 
72    (1981) 150 CLR 225.  
73    (2001) 206 CLR 1; 178 ALR 634 at [46]. 
74   Ibid at [50]. 
75   Perre v Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180 at 194, 202, 236, 258-260. 
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 revealed a serious occasion  for giving the information and that it would be relied 
upon.76 
 
Although the public body in Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board,77 by majority, narrowly 
escaped liability, it does raise the question of the extent to which public bodies 
should give information of that nature to an enquiring public.  The information itself 
was an estimate of costs only (and was described as this).  However, even so, it is 
difficult to comprehend how such an estimate, given in a formal letter to a 
parliamentarian, would not be treated seriously and relied upon by the constituent 
who was seeking the information in the course of a business dealing. 
 
When an informal request for information is made to any public body, apart from 
information which is either prohibited from disclosure by statute or where 
dissemination is regulated by statute in the sense that the information provider is 
only authorized to disclose certain parts of the information, it is incumbent upon the 
officials who are the immediate custodians of the information to determine whether 
or not, and if so, how much of the information should be disclosed publicly. 
 
 
4. MISLEADING OR DECEPTIVE CONDUCT IN THE PROVISION OF 
INFORMATION BY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
 
The other source of possible liability in this context is liability for misleading or 
deceptive conduct under the relevant State Fair Trading Act.78 The Fair Trading 
Acts apply to the conduct of a person acting in trade or commerce.79  The Crown in 
right of the State80 and local governments81 are subject to the provisions in each 
                                                
76    (2001) 206 CLR 1; 178 ALR 634 at [143], [147] per Kirby and Callinan JJ with whom 
McHugh J agreed. 
77    (2001) 206 CLR 1; 178 ALR 634. 
78  Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW); Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld); Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA); 
Fair Trading Act 1990 (TAS); Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic); Fair Trading Act 1987 (WA); 
Fair Trading Act 1992 (ACT); Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Act 1990 (NT). 
79     It is conceded that there may be some differences in wording between some of the Fair 
Trading  
          Acts but for the purposes of this article , it is not necessary to delve into these 
differences. 
80  The States are not liable for misleading conduct under the Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Cth).  By virtue of s 2B of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) the Crown in right of the 
State is only subject to certain provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).  Part V is 
not listed.  
81  Local governments are not generally subject to the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 
because they are not trading or financial corporations.  A local government may however 
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 Fair Trading Act that prohibit misleading or deceptive conduct by persons acting in 
trade or commerce.82 The question to be posed at the outset is whether, in 
providing information to the public for reward or gratuitously, these public bodies 
are acting in trade or commerce. 
 
As a starting point, the High Court in Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v 
Nelson83 has stated that in order  to be involved in ‘ trade or commerce’, the 
offending conduct must have occurred ‘in the course of trading or a commercial 
relationship or otherwise bear a trading or commercial character’.84 In the context of 
public authorities the test is whether the provision of information by that body, 
regardless of its functions, occurred in the course of dealings ‘which, of their nature 
bear a trading or commercial character’.85 It has been generally accepted that the 
ordinary functions of government do not generally bear a commercial character 
although some activities of government could be described as having occurred in 
trade or commerce.  The question of whether or not a public body is acting in trade or 
commerce must be considered in the light of its statutory functions and undertaking.86 
The fact a fee may be charged for information is not determinative of trade or 
commerce87 with a key factor being whether the public body is acting in pursuance of 
a statutory obligation or is entering into a discretionary transaction aimed at 
commercial gain.   
 
In Mid Density Development Pty Ltd v Rockdale Municipal Council88 Davies J stated, 
in dictum, that the carrying out of a statutory function in the interest of the community 
was not a trading activity.  This is something different from the public body providing 
a service for reward beyond its statutory function under a contractual obligation to do 
so and the fee for the service costed as it would be if an ordinary commercial 
                                                                                                                                         
be liable for misleading conduct in trade or commerce engaged in via telecommunications 
(ie internet, telephone, radio or television broadcast). 
82   Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW), s 42; Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld), s 38; Fair Trading Act 
1987 (SA), s 56; Fair Trading Act 1990 (TAS), s 14; Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic), s 9; Fair 
Trading Act 1987 (WA), s 10; Fair Trading Act 1992 (ACT), s 12; Consumer Affairs and 
Fair Trading Act 1990 (NT), s 42. 
83  (1990) 169 CLR 594. 
84   Ibid at 604. 
85   Hearn v O’Rourke (2003) 129 FCR 63 at 70-76 per Dowsett J (dissenting). 
86    Markit Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation  [2007]  1 Qd R  253 at [38] per Muir J. 
87  Coshott v Woollahra Municipal Council (1988) 14 NSWLR 675 at 684 per Wood J; Burke 
v Forbes Shire Council (1987) 63 LGRA 1 at 10 per Allen J; Lismore City Council v 
Stewart (1989) 18 NSWLR 718 at 726 per Hope AJA. 
88   (1992) 39 FCR 579 at 585 (overruled (1993) 44 FCR 290 where relevant issue not 
considered). 
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 enterprise was performing the service.89 Elements which identify acting in trade and 
commerce might include tendering for the provision of a service with other 
commercial non government operators, promotion of the service to the wider 
community with a view to seeking custom in the same way as any commercial 
enterprise might do, perhaps, by the identification of a clear profit motive in the 
transaction.90 For example, if a government agency was required by statute to 
provide accurate information for a prescribed fee as to the whereabouts of a publicly 
owned asset on a specified lot of land and incorporated a map of an area in that 
advice, it would not be acting in trade and commerce in so doing.  However, if the 
same map is enhanced to a standard expected for sale to the public as a 
commercially available item for a much greater fee, then in offering such a map for 
sale, it may be acting in trade and commerce.  This would particularly be the case if 
the government body in this latter instance was not the only purveyor of maps of that 
commercial quality and was in obvious competition with commercial operators for 
custom.   
 
The difference between performing a statutory function and conducting a business 
was highlighted in the Federal Court decision of RP Data v State of Queensland.91 
Collier J was required to consider if an agreement entered into between the State 
and RP Date for the sale of bulk valuation data was conduct ‘in the course of a 
business’ for the purposes of s 2B of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).  Her 
Honour’s conclusion that the State’s conduct was in the course of a business rested 
upon a close analysis of s 77 of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 (Qld).  This section 
allowed the State, in its discretion to sell bulk data on any terms it considered 
appropriate.  As such this discretion operated outside of the activities necessary for 
the fulfilment of the statutory duty to collect and make publicly available such 
information.  This interpretation was consistent with the purpose of s 77, which as 
stated by the Minister upon its introduction was to allow the sale of information ‘on a 
commercial basis’.92 This was to be contrasted with the statutory obligation of the 
State under s 76 of the legislation to provide valuation data on the valuation roll to a 
person who pays the prescribed fee.  The fact that a fee was charged did not mean 
the conduct was in trade or commerce. 
                                                
89   Paramedical Services Pty Ltd v Ambulance Service of New South Wales (2005) 217 ALR 
502 at 519 
90    JS McMillan Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 77 FCR 337 at 355 per Emmett J 
91  [2007] FCA 1639. 
92  Queensland Parliament, Legislative Assembly, Second Reading Speech, Valuation of 
Land Amendment Bill, The Hon AG Eaton Minister for Land Management, 10 March 
1992, p 4019. 
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Therefore, in general, a public body will not be acting in trade and commerce when 
providing information for a fee under a statutory obligation to do so.  However, the 
provision of information on commercial terms to third party providers will be conduct 
in trade or commerce. 
 
5. DISCLAIMER OF LIABILITY FOR INACCURATE GOVERNMENT 
INFORMATION 
 
Before considering the new contexts in which government information is provided 
to the public or other parties and the liability attaching thereto, the effectiveness of 
attempts to minimise or avoid liability through the use of disclaimers needs 
examination.  The material published by government bodies, to which the majority 
of disclaimers relate tends to be informational rather than representational, in the 
sense of inducing persons to acquire an interest in some property.  That said, there 
are some principles concerning the use and interpretation of disclaimers which cut 
across both types of disclaimed material, especially where the disclaimer is being 
utilised to negate the effect of reliance upon alleged misleading conduct.  Some 
important features relevant to the dissemination of information by government are 
relevant to construction of a disclaimer. 
 
First, in the usual course of events, the government agency is the sole repository of 
the information being sought rather than the disclaimed information, such as in a 
sales brochure, being one of a number of informational sources of the recipient on 
the same subject matter.  In other words, the information may not be capable of 
being verified from any other source.  Secondly, there is a higher expectation in the 
information recipient that the material, the accuracy of which is being disclaimed, is 
correct and being sourced from properly maintained records.  Thirdly, the 
information is likely to be factual in nature being capable of proof rather than 
predictive or representational.  These factors place a somewhat different emphasis 
upon the object of the disclaimer compared to those disclaimers in sales materials 
which are seeking to invite offers to purchase and requesting the information 
recipient to conduct their own independent investigation of the subject matter.  This 
is not feasible or relevant in the case of government information. 
 
Having regard to these features there are seminal issues concerning disclaimers in 
this type of government communication.  First, the question should be asked what 
 exactly is being disclaimed.  Is it the accuracy of the actual information or is it the 
reliability of the process of retrieval and presentation? Or is it both? The usual rule 
of interpretation, that the clause is to be given its ordinary and natural meaning, 
applies.93 In determining the breadth of a disclaimer a courts may take into account: 
(i) the usual procedures adopted by the particular department from which the 
information is being retrieved and the expectations of the intended recipient;  
(ii) the nature of the information and the reason for the request; 
(iii) whether the disclaimer is conspicuous to a reader so as to be taken into 
account when requesting the information;94  
(iv) whether the disclaimer is purporting to disclaim liability only for information 
compiled by the public body concerned or does it extend to subject matter in 
the response obviously created by a third party, even another government 
department whose direct liability has not been disclaimed? 
 
The majority of  reported decisions95 in which a public body has sought to enliven a 
disclaimer as a defence to a claim for loss caused by the supply of inaccurate 
information concern a request authorised by the Environmental Planning and 
Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), s 149(5) where the disclaimer has been embedded 
in that authorisation.  The section provides that ‘a council shall not incur any liability 
in respect of any advice provided in good faith pursuant to subsection (5).’ This 
subsection referred to advice which a council might supply in a certificate where 
that advice was not requested but which it might include as ‘such other matters 
affecting the land of which it (the council) might be aware.’ In some cases another 
disclaimer appeared upon the certificates to the effect: 
The above information has been taken from the council’s records, but the 
council cannot accept responsibility for omission or inaccuracy. 
 
In relation to the ‘good faith’ disclaimer, it has been held that this does not relate to 
the issue of the honesty of the information provider as much as to a guarantee that 
the records will be properly accessed for the information provided ‘of which the 
council is aware’.  In Mid Density Developments Pty Ltd v Rockdale Municipal 
Council,96 evidence showed that the council officer charged with the collation of the 
information (regarding flooding to a property being purchased) did not properly 
                                                
93  Darlington Futures v Delco Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 500. 
94  For example, see Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 592 at 608, 633 
and 651 
95   Burke v Forbes Shire Council (1987) 63 LGERA 1;Lismore City Council v Stewart (1989) 
18 NSWLR 718 (CA); Mid Density Developments Pty Ltd v Rockdale Municipal Council 
(1993) 44 FCR 290 (FC). 
96   (1993) 44 FCR 290. 
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 access the council records but completed the certificate by guesswork which turned 
out to be wrong.  In relation to the issue of providing information in ‘good faith’, the 
court said, in dictum: 
 
A council is reasonably to be expected to respond to an application for information 
of the character of the obvious significance of the character sought here by 
recourse to its records.  If the Council represents that it has done so…then it still 
may be acting in ‘good faith’ if a real attempt has been made, even though an error 
was made in the inspection or the results of the inspection were inaccurately 
represented in the certificate which is issued.97 
                
For the disclaimer upon the grounds of ‘good faith’ to work there had to be a real 
attempt by the authority to answer the request for information available at least by 
recourse to the materials available to it and that had not occurred.98 The ‘good faith’ 
exclusion of liability would cover liability for negligence where the records had been 
carelessly accessed and wrong information given.99 
 
The second issue evident in the case law concerns questions as to the 
interpretation of the actual words of the disclaimer.  For example, what exactly does 
the expression ‘omission or inaccuracy’ refer to in the context of a disclaimer? Did it 
refer to the local authority records from which the information was being sourced or 
the certificate itself.  Allen J in Burke v Forbes Shire Council100 interpreted that 
exact phrase to refer to the accuracy of the certificate rather than the records.101 It 
is conceded that in any tract of information from a public body there is likely to be 
information derived from the public and other agencies of government for which the 
disseminating agency may not wish to accept responsibility.  Allen J further 
interpreted the expression in the disclaimer ‘cannot accept responsibility’ as being 
limited in ambit and not a blanket declaration of accepting no responsibility at all in 
all events.102 It is now appropriate to apply these principles; to the extent that they 
are capable of application, to two new circumstances in which governments are 
supplying information to the public – online services and through third party 
providers. 
 
 
6.  NEW PARADIGMS OF GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR INFORMATION 
                                                
97    Ibid at 299. 
98    Ibid at 300. 
99  Lismore City Council v Stewart (1989) 18 NSWLR 718 at 726-727 (CA). 
100   (1987) 63 LGRA 1. 
101    Ibid at 20. 
102    Ibid. 
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Improvements in information technology are causing governments to re-think the 
ways in which they provide information to the public.  Not only does technology 
allow greater access to information held by government but it also creates greater 
opportunity for access to combined or aggregated data represented through the 
use of a geo-spatial database.  The opportunities presented by improved 
technology that easily aggregates data for sale to consumers is no longer the sole 
purview of commercial providers with governments embracing similar opportunities 
for revenue raising.  This Part examines how this change of paradigm in the 
provision of information more readily to consumers will affect the previous relatively 
settled principles of government liability for inaccurate information. 
 
6.1 Free Supply of Government Information Online  
This method of seeking information from government agencies is becoming one of 
the most commonly utilised by members of the public.  Usually information is 
provided without request or fee.  In many cases, the data provided is an 
aggregation from two or more data sets, held by a number of different agencies 
who only have responsibility for the accuracy of their own material.  The most 
common example is where property information is provided in an aggregated form 
with mapping data.103  What is the government’s liability for inaccurate 
representation of data in that form? The principles of negligent misstatement 
discussed above continue to have application.  Does the provision of official 
information by a government on a website carry with it the assumption that the 
government knows or ought to know that any member of the public may rely upon 
the information for a serious matter? Since the decision of San Sebastian Pty Ltd v 
The Minister Administering the Environmental and Planning Act 1979, there is no 
need for there to a request for the information or advice.  In that case a majority of 
the High Court held: 
  
The existence of an antecedent request for information or advice certainly assists in 
demonstrating reliance, which is a cornerstone of liability for negligent 
misstatement.  However, such a request is by no means essential though it has 
been suggested that instances of liability for misstatement volunteered negligently 
will be ‘rare’.  104 
 
                                                
103  See for example Information Queensland at http://gis.qld.gov.au/iqed/map/ (accessed 28 
July 2008). 
104  (1986) 162 CLR 340 at 565-7; 68 ALR 161 at 170. 
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 In the case of information provided via a website there is no request, unless it can 
be argued that performing a search on the website is the equivalent of a request.  
Nevertheless, there is clearly an argument that a duty to ensure the information is 
accurate arises.  Given the nature of the data and the fact that it is most likely not 
available elsewhere, it would be reasonable to assume that reliance will be placed 
upon it by its recipient.  Further, while it would not be possible for the government 
agency to know the precise use to which the information might be put in any 
particular instance; it would reasonably be able to ascertain the probable use to 
which the information could be put and the fact that the probable use may reveal a 
serious purpose.  This would be particularly so where the information related to 
some characteristic of real property. 
 
The majority of consumers who obtain information through an official government 
website will expect that the provenance of the data has been checked for accuracy 
both in the original information and in the way in which the aggregated data is 
represented prior to being released for public viewing or use.  A government, in 
anticipation of this expectation, should control the type and quality of data available 
via the website to consumers.  The difficulty for government is that despite 
reasonable efforts the information may not be accurate (having been generated 
from electronic records or compiled automatically from data input either by a 
member of the public or an official in the agency), thereby increasing the probability 
of inaccurate information being disseminated.  As the government agency 
responsible for releasing the information may not be the agency statutorily 
responsible for the truth of the information consideration should be given to the 
protocols put in place for obtaining quality information from multiple agencies and to 
the use of a disclaimer. 
 
Proof of the second requirement in a claim of negligent misstatement, reasonable 
reliance, may depend on the nature of the information and the way in which it is 
presented.  For example, a website purporting to provide ‘official’ information about 
land, such as title details, should be viewed differently to a website providing easy 
access to street addresses for visitors to the city.  The different context and 
purpose sought to be achieved by the different websites, despite purporting to 
provide the same or similar information, would be a factor in considering 
reasonable reliance.  Relevant factors a court may take into account are: 
 
 (i) Does the website purport to provide official government information? If there 
is no other method for discovering the information this will increase the 
reasonableness of the reliance on the information. 
(ii) Is there any other method of discovering the information through official 
request and payment of a fee? If there is an official process for obtaining 
information from the government agency, a website may be viewed in a 
similar way to the informal request for information made over the phone in L 
Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council.105 
(iii) Is the government agency supplying the information through their website in 
a better position than anyone else to ascertain its accuracy? This will 
contribute to the reasonableness of reliance upon the information.  For 
example it may be reasonable to rely upon a local government website that 
provides rating information.  In contrast reliance on a State government 
website for the same information may not be reasonable because they are 
not responsible for the accuracy of the information.106 
(iv) Does the nature of the information and the usual purpose for which it is 
used (ie property details for the purchase of land) mean that another official 
method of obtaining the information for a fee should be used? This may cast 
doubt on the reasonableness of relying upon free information. 
(v) Is the accuracy of the information effectively disclaimed? An effective and 
conspicuous disclaimer may impact on the reasonableness of the 
consumer’s reliance on the information available through a website. Such a 
disclaimer will be subject to the same difficulties of interpretation as in a 
paper in environment as well a some additional issues arising from the 
electronic environment: 
(a) The disclaimer should not be too wide preferably disclaiming specific 
information rather than generally disclaiming all information available 
through the on-line site.  Courts have consistently denied efficacy to 
broadly worded, catch-all  disclaimers which are neither directed to the 
                                                
105  (1981) 150 CLR 225; 36 ALR 385. 
106  This has some analogy with the cases dealing with reliance upon representations by real 
estate agents.  See for example Presser v Caldwell Estates Pty Ltd [1971] 2 NSWLR 471 
where the court held that it was not reasonable to rely upon an agent for information 
about the geological structure of the subsoil for building due to the prior existence of a 
rubbish tip on the land.  It is reasonable though to rely upon a real estate agent for 
information concerning a description of the property or its value: MacCormick v Nowland 
(9188) ATPR 40-852; Roots v Oentory [1983] 2 Qd R 745; Richardson v Norris Real 
Estate Ltd [1977] 1 NZLR 152. 
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 particular material that the author wishes to be disclaimed or, where the 
consequences of conduct is to be disclaimed, to that conduct.107  
(b) The disclaimer should be conspicuous and written into the program 
such that any potential user is bound to notice it and agrees to the use 
of the website according to its terms by acknowledging having read it 
prior to being able to access the information disclaimed.  Some 
guidance can be obtained from the judicial approach to the incorporation 
of terms into internet contracts and website licence agreements.  
Generally if a court is satisfied that a consumer has actually clicked their 
assent or it would have been impossible to proceed but for clicking on 
the acceptance icon, a finding that the terms are incorporated will 
generally follow.108 Therefore, where a website requires a consumer to 
click ‘I agree’ or ‘I accept’ before using the website, a court is likely to 
conclude that the consumer agreed to those terms of use, including a 
disclaimer.  This should be contrasted with a situation where a 
consumer is able to proceed without expressly indicating assent to the 
terms of use.  In that case, a consumer may successfully allege they did 
not see the terms or agree to them.109 
(c) Where the data originates from another source, other than the 
disseminating agency, any disclaimer should name the generating 
agency and whether the data has been displayed without being checked 
for accuracy at the point of publication.  In other words is the 
disseminating agency merely a conduit for the information.110  
                                                
107   See Seabridge Australia Pty Ltd v JLW (NSW) Pty Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 415; upheld on 
appeal Lezam Pty Ltd v Seabridge Australia Pty Ltd (1992) 107 ALR 291 (FC). 
108  XPEL Technologies Corp v Maryland Performance Works Ltd No SA-05-CA-0593-XR, 
2006 WL 1851703 (WD Tex May 19 2006) (argument by the consumer that was not 
aware of ever clicking assent rejected); Eslworldwide.com Inc v Interland Inc No 06 CV 
2503 (LBS), 2006 WL 1716881 (SDNY June 21 2006) (evidence of actual clicking given); 
Recursion Softward Inc v Interactive Intelligence Inc 425 F Supp 2d 756 (ND  Tex 2006) 
(evidence that could not download unless clicked ‘yes’ to terms).  This approach has been 
accepted in Australia in Goldstein v Jumbo Corporation Limited (Civic Claims) [2006] 
VCAT 2472. 
109  Specht v Netscape Communications Corp150 F Sup  2d 585 (S.D.N.Y.  2001), affirmed 
306 F3d 17 (2d Cir 2002); NJ Davis, ‘Presumed Assent: the Judicial Acceptance of 
Clickwrap’ (2007) 22 Berkeley Tech Law Journal 577, 585.  Contrast Ticketmaster v 
Tickets.com 2000 WL 525390 at 1; Cairo Inc v Crossmedia Services Inc No V04-
04825JW, 2005 WL 756610.  See also MA Lemley, ‘Terms of Use’ (2006) 91 Minnesota 
Law Review 459. 
110  Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 592; Lawson Hill Estate Pty Ltd v 
Tovegood Pty Ltd (2004) 214 ALR 478, on appeal Dalton v Lawson Hill Estate Pty Ltd 
[2005] FCAFC 169 (issue of whether agent for seller of rural property made it sufficiently 
clear that information supplied for brochure came from seller and that agent acting as a 
conduit only taking no responsibility for the material). 
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 (d) If the information is of a general nature the publishing agency should 
indicate that it should not be relied upon and more detailed accurate 
information sought from another source.  For example, there may be 
general information made available about specified property giving the 
name of the owner and the description of the land.  Persons accessing 
this information should be told that this is not an official record of these 
facts and that the official record is available from the Titles Office.   
 
The ‘authoritative’ nature of government information and its other characteristics, 
such as being a sole repository of such information collected under statutory 
authority for a serious purpose such as levying taxation, makes it difficult to 
disclaim its accuracy regardless of the wording of the disclaimer.  This is clear both 
in respect of information especially requested by the recipient and supplied on 
paper and that available freely on line to any member of the general public. 
 
6.2 Sale or Licensing of Information to Commercial Providers 
There is an increasing tendency of government for profit to license commercial 
providers to supply government information in its original form, or in some form 
enhanced by the provider, to the public for a fee.  In most cases, the raw data 
remains available to the public to obtain directly from the relevant government 
agency or agencies in the case of multiple data sets.  There are also circumstances 
where the commercial provider aggregates the subject matter of multiple data sets 
to produce an enhanced product which is more attractive to the user for the 
particular purpose desired.  Does the provision of bulk data to third parties for 
commercial use give rise to new liability issues for government? The potential 
liability of the government to the commercial provider and consumers for inaccurate 
information disseminated in this way is examined. 
 
6.3 Government and Commercial Provider 
The relationship between the government agency and commercial provider will be 
largely governed by the contract between the parties.  The agreement will usually 
include the terms upon which the commercial provider is licensed to use the 
information provided, the limits upon its use and any limits upon the liability of the 
government agency should inaccuracies appear in the information.  In drafting any 
disclaimer of liability the government agency should give careful consideration to 
addressing: 
 
 (i) The fact the data originates from a number of government agencies or non-
government third parties; 
(ii) The information published is created and maintained by these agencies to 
their own standards; 
(iii) The data is not checked for completeness, currency or error at the point of 
publication; 
(iv) There is no warranty that the data can be used for any particular purpose or 
that it will remain accurate if aggregated with other information; 
(v) The data is provided for a particular purpose and cannot  be used for other 
unrelated purposes, such as direct marketing.111  
 
Beyond the terms of the contract, the entry into a commercial arrangement opens 
the door to the potential of a claim for misleading conduct by the commercial 
provider against the government agencies.  The risk of such a claim in respect of 
inaccurate data can be minimised by a suitable disclaimer that clearly provides the 
government agency is merely passing on the data (maintained by others) and does 
not warrant its accuracy.  This type of disclaimer has been successful in other 
situations where a person is merely acting as the conduit of information for another.  
A fact made clear by the disclaimer.112  
 
6.4 Government and Consumer – Inaccurate Information 
Government liability for inaccurate information given by the government to a third 
party provider and then to a consumer may arise either: 
(a) as accessorial liability under the Trade Practices or Fair Trading Acts for the 
misleading conduct of the commercial provider; or 
(b) primary liability for misleading conduct under the Fair Trading Act as the 
source of the information.   
 
6.4.1 Misleading Conduct – Accessory  
A government agency that enters a contract to sell bulk information to a commercial 
provider will be acting in trade and commerce, as that phrase is defined in the Fair 
Trading or Trade Practices Act.113 Likewise, the commercial provider selling 
                                                
111  RP Data Ltd v State of Queensland [2007] FCA 1639. 
112  Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 592; Dalton v Lawson Hill Estate 
Pty Ltd  [2005] FCAFC 169 ( issue of whether agent for seller of rural property made it 
sufficiently clear that information supplied for brochure came from seller and that agent 
acting as a conduit only tasking no responsibility for the material). 
113  RP Data Ltd v State of Queensland [2007] FCA 1639 [55] – [63]. 
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 information to the public consumer will be acting in trade or commerce whether 
there was any value-adding to the final product or not by that private provider.  The 
commercial provider who disseminates misleading information to a consumer will, 
absent an effective disclaimer, have engaged in misleading conduct, whether the 
provider knows the information is false or not.114 An imposition of liability on the 
commercial provider raises the question of the flow on liability to the government 
agency.  As there is no agency or like relationship between the government and 
commercial provider, the commercial provider cannot be said to engage in the 
misleading conduct ‘on behalf of’ the government agency.115 The alternative 
argument is that the government agency is an accessory to the provider’s 
misleading conduct.  Accessorial liability requires knowing involvement by the 
government agency in the misleading conduct of the commercial provider.  One of 
the key requirements for accessorial liability is knowledge of the essential elements 
of the contravention, in this case, knowledge that the information is false or 
misleading.116 Proof the government agency possesses this knowledge is unlikely 
due to the following: 
 
(i) bulk information supplied by government to a commercial provider is not 
capable of being sensibly checked prior to release.  The government 
agency is therefore unlikely to have direct knowledge of the falsity of any 
particular data;  
(ii) depending upon the nature of the information, the government itself may not 
be the original source of the information.  For example, the government 
relies upon accurate completion of a property information form to acquire 
information about the sale price of a property or the names of the buyers.  
Again the government agency collecting the information will rely for its 
accuracy on a member of the public and is unlikely to have any knowledge 
of falsity; or 
                                                
114  Intent is not an element of the contravention.  Liability can attach where false information 
is given out honestly.  See Parkdale Custombuilt Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 
149 CLR 191 at 197. 
115  Under the Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld), s 95 a person is liable for the conduct of another 
person engage din on behalf of the first person.  The equivalent provision in the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) is s 84. 
116  For an examination of the test of accessorial liability refer to Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 
CLR 661, 667; Allstate Life Insurance Company v Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Group Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 26, 37; Westbay Seafoods (Aust) Pty Ltd v Tranpacific 
Standardbred Agency Pty Ltd (1996) ATPR (Digest) 46-162; Medical Benefits Fund of 
Australia Ltd v Cassidy (2003) 205 ALR 402. 
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 (iii) the information provided may be new information created by the 
aggregation of different data by the commercial provider.  The government 
agency is unlikely to any knowledge of the newly aggregated data.   
 
6.4.2  Misleading Conduct – Primary liability 
The alternative basis of liability is that the government agency in releasing 
misleading information to the commercial provider for provision to consumers is 
engaging in misleading conduct not only toward the commercial provider but also to 
the ultimate consumers.  A claim by a consumer will succeed if there is a nexus 
between the misleading conduct of the government agency and the loss to the 
consumer.117 Generally, a consumer will have to prove that they relied upon the 
misleading information released by the government agency.  Unlike a claim in 
negligent misstatement there is no requirement for the reliance to be reasonable118 
or for the failure by the government to be in breach of any duty of care.  Although 
government liability to the commercial provider for misleading conduct may be 
limited by a contractual disclaimer, as discussed above, the same is not true of the 
potential liability to the consumer.  This creates a potential conflict with the legal 
position of the government when providing information directly to the consumer.  In 
the case of a direct supply the government agency is not acting in trade or 
commerce and liability for negligent misstatement is capable of being disclaimed.  
In the other case the government is acting in trade or commerce by the sale of the 
information and there is no direct disclaimer of their liability for false information 
disseminated by the commercial provider.  Although a claim for misleading conduct 
appears prima facie possible the success of such a claim is subject to resolution of 
the following issues: 
 
(i) Will a consumer be able to prove that they relied upon the government to 
ensure the accuracy of the information and not the commercial provider? 
(ii) Is the government agency acting in trade or commerce when engaging in 
the misleading conduct toward the consumer? While the relationship 
between the government agency and commercial provider is one in trade or 
commerce, is the relationship between the government and consumer any 
different to the direct supply of information to a consumer? Will the fact 
                                                
117  Janssen-Cilag Pty Ltd v Pfizer Pty Ltd (1992) 37 FCR 526. 
118  Charben Haulage Pty Ltd v Environmental & Earth Sciences Pty Ltd (2004) ATPR 
(Digest) 46-252; [2004] FCA 403 – examines the difference in liability for negligent 
misstatement and misleading conduct. 
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 different information is provided through the commercial provider change 
the outcome? 
(iii) Is the misleading nature of the information due to the way in which the 
commercial provider presents the information or aggregates it with other 
information? It may be possible for the government agency to prove that the 
information was accurate when provided by them to the commercial 
provider thereby removing liability. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Government and it various agencies will always be a primary, and in many 
instances, the only source of much valuable information for the public.  Whilst much 
information will still be available in paper form, developments in technology present 
exciting new opportunities for the dissemination of information by government to 
consumers.  These opportunities are not without legal risks, particularly where 
inaccurate or false information is provided to consumers.  The provisions of 
information via the internet or licensed commercial providers create potential 
government liability for negligent misstatement and misleading conduct.  Avoidance 
or minimisation of liability should not be left solely to the operation of disclaimers, 
the effectiveness of which is often poor.  To avoid liability for negligent 
misstatement, an information provider must be able to show that reasonable steps 
are routinely taken to ensure the accuracy of disseminated information and further 
that protocols for the retrieval and dissemination of the information exist and are 
followed.  The potential for a finding of negligence can be reduced and the 
effectiveness of a disclaimer improved by showing that there is a coherent protocol 
in place to ensure accuracy and provide for the management of information.  In an 
electronic environment the adherence to a protocol for the retrieval of information to 
the user of a website should be easy to follow.  The greater difficulty in an 
electronic environment is the maintenance of the accuracy of information where 
multiple parties may be responsible for the collection of the data and different data 
sets are more easily combined to create new information, the accuracy of which 
needs to be checked.  As examined, the introduction of statutory liability for 
misleading conduct, introduced through the entry into commercial arrangements to 
sell information, increases the complexity of the liability matrix for government 
because, liability under the statutes is strict and disclaimers are generally 
ineffective for disclaiming the accuracy of information.   
 
